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:::1 TI!E SCPREME COURT 
0f THE STATE OF CTAH 
-__:J_, 
Case No. 19172 
-,I'\~~.s -J ?_\_3ER, 3.r.d 
·:J).L'~E~ ?. F.\E:SK, 3P.., 
BRIEF OF ')EFE~lDANT-APPELLANT 
ST_'\TE~1ENT OF THE !<IND or C.:\SE 
Trns c3se inv::Jl"es the legal effect of an oral 
_Tu: l J - 'l '·- in·iuce a lcng-ti;ne tenant (Appellant) to sign 
rnc<C·~ .·aar ·.-.::-1<:;:en ::-ene•,;al lease for Appellant's regular 
~==1~e ~Ga·:e ~~ ~he ~e~house Building. The regular off ice 
~L1ce ~ad oeen ccntinuously leased by Appellant for many 
the wriccen renewal lease for 
'J :l --·=e apace ~as signed by Appellant, the 
thereby makin: - L j 
lessor's prumise '::> .2'rcr2 l Lu. c.. 
renewal lease and mo ·ed f~=m t~e tu1l~1~~ as ~f April l, 
1981. Responder..t SC.'1 t:.hen ,::ormnen::e· t:-: i 3 ::.c':.J ·Jr c.._:o_ -:.ns-t: 
written renewal lease. 
DISPOSITION rn LOFER COu'.''l' 
s~cecific elements of an oral contrac': Jc it: C'J•.lld 
::-e-.Jrr·. a verdic'::. £or .".pµellan'.:. 3ecause o= <:ne 
elements of an o:ca2- contract an::1 retG.:::-:--:ed 3. "erc:::i_::::'=. :or 
Respondent. 
~1. l:: ':e!'ES~ 3.;:d 
''.- -
·:.cit ."'.;::ir_;elLtnt · ..1as entitled to rescind 
1 ~ - ,:;;, r f +- he ? r ':lm i se , 
.T!1• I' EM ENT OF F l\.CTS 
?or c0n·1enience t~ey have been divided 
l. Il". June, 19?9, ."'.ppellant \fatkins & Faber had 
~·ears under a succession 
l:: ·-'=':. 1-::?ase~,. r F-·290; see Exhib1 t 2-P). 
=' u l ld .J. i1 i as .'1r. :~1cnarC >J. ~1 scher. (R-263, 290). Mr. 
'<C"nc-_°'ct·. P. S .nr: car. <.vas 11r. Fischer's resident building 
~.an,-i~.-:;~ J_;.·.~ 3.·::eur: :-:r- ::.egotiating leases. (R-263, 264, 
r~e ~atkir:s & Faber lease then in effect was 
J"·~ :c_:. r,-ec:n~nat•'O ~r, June 31), 1979 (R-265, 290), and Mr. 
-~r:3c~2d ~~. ~~alter P. Faber, Jr. several tj_mes 
ua.:::-': )-- :-u.ne, i9-;n J;i regard to signing 
~3.oe:::- ~;~C. ~t:::. S'.·r~_;it.or. ~~at r11atk1ns & 
1~ ad~ace~t space on ~he sixt~ floor 
7~ ~ene~~al ~ease ~nless t~e additional 
space was promised. 2 1-=i G , 
5. At thac tir:te, I~,lL ·,,.;as 3. rnor_th-t·:J-rnonth tenant 
of the adjacent space en che sixth floor and was planning 
to move from the adjacent space to tne eleventh floor in 
the building. (R-267, ro, 292). 
6. Mr. Swinton told Mr. Faber that he didn't 
think there would be ill'.y probleP1. in gei:ting the adjacent 
space but that Mr. Fischer, the owner of the building, was 
out of town and would have to make the promise when he 
returned. (R-268, 294, also see R-232). 
7. Mr. Swinton then talked to Mr. Fischer 
about Watkins & Faber's request, and Mr. Fischer's 
reac~ion was ~avorable. (R-269-70). 
8. A week or so prior to the end of June, 
1979, Mr. Swinton deli·;ered the ;:iroposed rene',;al lease 
for Watkins & Faber's regular office space co ~atkins & 
Faber's office. (R-293, 265-66). 
9. The lease r~~ai~ed in t~e office ~f :ia~k~ns 
& Faber c..r:C_ >.1as no-r: signeC by >Ja<:.kins ~ F3.ber c.ntil Jul2· 
Faber ':ia"C:-;~;:o; 
I R-29 7-98) !Ir. ~', 1, ~ _'·Ir . 'f: ~3;:12 '!r. 
-5-
,."' ~ate and after discussing the situation 
~- sa1~ he was informed that IML was planning 
"'1 ',i1r, "·Arc 0r three months and would be moved 
::r "' :: 0 .'>l:<th :lr.or by the end of December, 1979. 
1'""1~~ :S-08). ~r. Fischer then stated that if Watkins 
: fAt~r would sign the renewal lease for the regular 
o~f1ce space, tne adjacent space would be made available 
::o ~ackins i ?aber not later than December 31, 1979. 
I:='- 2 ') 8) . 
10. Also at the time of the promise, Mr. 
F1scCJer, '.1r. Sw1ntan and Mr. Fal:ler went into the adjacent 
~~ace cr~pied by IML, discussed Watkins & Faber's need 
~or se~eral add1t1onal offices, the locations of the 
:li .. 1~i1r::i :)art~t.101:s for the additional space, and agreed 
·~at t~~ add1t1cnal space would be rented at the "going 
1R-272-7 3, 296, also see R-233-36). Mr. Faber 
•:1er. s; ~reed tne written renewal lease. (R-298). Both 
C··:r ~:r_ awJ '.'lr. '.'aber testified to the above facts. 
·rv ,. , ~· "'as nut ;:or-eser.t at trial and did not testify. 
11. The written renewal lease does not contain 
-,::1 ;r. ;,r·)\'lSl·on. Exhibit 2-P). 
:.-: ·Jc::obec, 1919, Ylr. Faber was seriously 
~s :1·JSP1~al::ed ~ntil scme~1me in January, 
19 80. 'E- 3r;n \ . 
(R-301). 
13. 
t:1e ~ 1 e'/er. t~-, 
floor. ( P.-28.J-36' 2!)1)' 302\. 
l~. IML con tl:".ued l '::S '•.'~''< Jee ':he r-emodell 1nc; 
of the eleve:;t:;. iloor but ~ad ~2,_::ii=. :::-·:11pl+-?1:eci t:-:e sa'lle .:::_nG 
therefore had :10t ;no\-ed b'_l Septembe:::-, 2.J81J ·.-.,Tier. >1::.-. 
Fischer sold ;:he riuilC:inc; to S<::i. 
15. \'Jhen sc;11 ~UI'ChaSeci '-:~P 8Ul ~dl:"'.•.j 1 sc;,1 ::ra?e 
IY1L a -Nr1+:t.en long-i:er.T'~ lease ::::::.r i::1e a·.:i:::i.ce;'.': space ·~r. 
In.-:') ]-•\Ii) • 
303-04). 
:::~ - ? 1; ) - ') •; ' 
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cuuid not have the adjacent space on 
tnat SC~ would lease to Watkins & Faber 
,na~ 'Jffice space on another floor. SCM 
l - ·.i2c'<ir'.S .', !'aber still wanted to have all 
r: ~r'e floor then SCM •,;ould lease the entire 
~-,'a.i:..~1:i.s & Faber, and then Watkins & Faber 
111~ he resGons:ble :'or the excess space which SCM 
s1~~este~ •at~ins ~ Faber Might be able to sublease to 
18. Watkins ~ Faber notified SCM that such 
.on~2ls ~ere nut acceptable because Watkins & Faber's 
,•r~·~r e:<;)erience •.cit'1 the separation of offices had been 
.r:sat1c;:~c~1c· 2nd because of Mr. Faber's physical 
( E-3() ~) Watkins & Faber moved from the 
( R-308-10). 
19. Ir. tre :'a.Clo:' 1981, SC'1 commenced an action 
~a-~1~s • ~~ber :'or unpaid rent from and after 
1-'}81 'V~.er', '.·Ja~kins ; Faber moved :Ersm the building. 
"~ The trial court refused ~o allow the jury to 
~ r:.;:;. ;_ ...:t~:C ,~··1e::::. :e~ ""::.1'2 ,_:.:ca.l ~.comise · ...ras ccnsideration for -she 
cr1~ten lease of July 9, 1979. The lower 
_":.d'"'i.C. 3.s I µ01nteC. CJU-: in chambers, the 
·:.'::_~_r: 1r.·:: ::-::---::1...:g 3. :;-coC. :;-,cr-::.ior. ~~this 
,_;;, _:~:~r>=l3.!"'.':S a"e :-e::e::r::-ed :o thei:- ::1e.::eESe 
as a fa1: 
net ·.' J -.=.·, 
case, ol:,. 
ance or 
21. The tr1J.'. 
for the ad Cit ion a: Si-6'.:e - l l l c _t_ 3. 
Watkins & Faber. In.otr•Jcti~ns JC, ::<-1~1) ::.r.-.:: l -
state as rollows: 
INSTRl'CTION \;o. 
You ~ust ~s:~~~ 3 ·erd1ct ~:·:: ~~e ?la1n~1~~ J~~ess 
the defendants establish b~ a ~repc~ 1jer3nc~ __ ~~e 
evidence t:le ~l"Jth Oi all ) f t.:.~~'2 ~'J} l _'.-.-1.'."c·'.::;" :"_r-'?0Sl ~ :_ :::r_S: 
l. 
into an )ral contra.ct +:o er.ter lI:"':.J 3 
addit1on3l s~ace .J~ t~e s:~<tn f:J~r 
r: :.:--ier-e -.va.s suer: a11 ,::.ral 
was in~enced b~· ~he par~1~~ 
~·31.Je~ enteceC 
~~r1~ter1 leas~ r 
-: : 1e ~Je·N·ho 1_:;se SLi ~-12 
cc ::i :::::'Jnd1t1on preceC.~nt t:.:J i:..r1e Nr1 t":.er-. l~a32 aq::~e~~ .. ': 
for su~te 606 becoming er:'e·::tl .. C>. 
3. If SCC'.' .:er:_: ::2c:., ':1/aS 
breached. 
4. If t~-.ere -,.,as ::3<...2C."'. 3.r. -Jr 3 J.. -=~:: ~::-ac:: 3r.d i ': «va.-; 
treached, ~~~ ~efen~a~~s 3C~~d ~1~~::1 3 ~~a~c~3ble ~'~ 2 
I~JST?J.~~---~l~~r 210. 1 - . 
:.:-ie te_::-::13 
.TlUSt '.;_,:i_,-c 
.e -::' .--~:;,.,, ~~a.:3e. 
r u : ~ ,-, : 
-9-
-~· T'lese ter;ns include the 
.r.~l s~ace to be leased, tne price 
e 3~d1t1cnal space, tbe term for the 
:n~l space, and the remodeling costs 
·:~ :i.dd1-=.1unal SSJace. 
~~e ~-3rt1es s::.12ulated and the court ruled 
:-_1~r.'3 :~1,.1,~·-j be 1:.aken 3.fter ::he jury retJ..red to 
Aopellant otJected to the lower court's 
~se Apoellant's requested Special Interrogatories 
~ al1'.:i J ;eneciill~· :'or the reason that Appellant only 
~~e-ed ~- ~r~~e tnat there was a promise to provide the 
_:_}r~~r3.C':.. R-J31). Appellant's exceptions to Instructions 
t~ ~~e issues ~nether ~~e ?r~mise was consid-
:-.r:r=! ·.-;h~::.i::-.e:::- ~:-ie 10'..;er cour~ 11:. substance improperly 
POic1T I. 
~'1E ~O\,i2P C'JlJRT ERRED Icl REF":S IclG 
- :i'.:'ISER THE I.ESSOR'S ORAL PROMISE FOR 
,1cr~'l:'>~L\:., SP.:l.,=E .".S CONSI:::JE?~".T:=O"I ?A.ID TO 
~~; :=- r_-l_·s _::._?~E:~L_:'._:i~ TO S IG:J '!'HE :-JRir:1~E ~J 
",\'~:='.·:.-:..~ :..E.::..SE ?0?, _:'._.PPE~~;i....\Jr:" Is ?.EGC~..:. • .K 
-l ,_ 
The lower ccurt conclude~ t:cat the lessor's oral 
promise was not consideration for tne written lease and 
that the promise itself was of no independent legal benefit 
to Appellant unless it was dete:Tnrced to be cin enforcecible 
oral contract containing certain specific elements; if those 
elements were established, then the resulting oral contract 
was a condition precedent. In Jury I;istruction 18 (P-142), 
the lower court stated: 
For an oral contract, if any, to be 
a condition precedent to a written lease 
agreement, the oral contract must have 
been intended by the parties to be full; 
performed before the written lease acree-
~ent was to become effective and binding. 
In this case, however, the perrar~ance of the written lease 
was begun solelj becacse 0f t~e ?romise and was begun ~o~t~s 
tne ~romise i~sel.:: :iad i:-:deper..J2nt ler;a.l s1::;n1:[.:i._c3.!1Ce 3.nci 
applicable 
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~~ oans1deration under Otah law and provable 
-':''l ience. Several recent Utah cases appear to 
Jr, F'.'1.:0.. Financial Corporation v. Hansen 
L''0-~ ~-=---!.---'-'-'-'-~ 0 617 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980), FMA sued 
H3~sen ~·~r an alleged breach of a written lease of a silo 
·3-L-: .;:-a.crr1 ~qui[:Jment. Hansen asserted the defense that the 
silo cas not installed by harvest time as orally agreed. 
_u r"L'> 'cn·2 L)1-1er court determined there was a complete 
~a1lure 't consideration because of failure to keep the 
:__, L3 l aqreemen t. As a result, the lessee, Hansen, did not 
3··e to ·~ont1nue the written lease. FMA appealed on the 
j1d n~~ ?rov1de when the construction of the silo was to 
oe .:c1culeted. FMA urged that the parol evidence rule 
FMA also argued that Hansen 
~w tnat the silo had not been timely installed but 
0 3,~er ~cknowledged in writing that the silo was complete. 
:·es;.•_-.r·3e cJ F'!A' s asser-tion of the parol evidence rule 
~\1A 1 s -bject1cn ~o the ~ral agreement, this court 
T~e standard ~arol e'Tldence rule is 
i~ extr3neous e~ije~=e may rr=t be used to 
contradict 
inst ~'Jl.ler::: 
pur;:ioc;e :,', j' 
safeguarJ.J ,.._~,C' J '., -.::::-''-;:_ 1 
men ts . .H S\,;e'.-c "".:- , -::i: ,._ , 1 l 
Wl th any· sucn 1 1.!!_{ecsc-,r l L 
SL ... L~n juc'-.J-
':e :ippl ied 
i -; l t · · 3. s tc 
defeat '.vhat :r1a" '.:•P ai,,_.\; +-,'J.p actual 
purpose and i:'t2''r: ~ ,c; >~,Lie.o, but 
should be applier~ u1 '.:.f-. -' .,, ~ ;:-easor: 
to ser'v'e the ends ~ 1J;-;t1ce. Il ,Joes not 
preclude proof of agreenents as to collateral 
matters relating to the contract or its 
performance, so lcn; as t_r,e~' J.re n(:1: incon-
sistent with ~or in repu~12t~~n of tne terms 
of the written 3.sreer:o 12r:':.. ~Jcr ·-:ces it 2revent 
proof that a parti did net per~orrn an 
obligation 'dhicn i-: ·.vas u.n. 1-=.erstccd 3.r.d aare~d 
by the parties was a condition precedent 
to the :::cn'.:ract becoming ef:ecti?e. T'1at 
applies to the circumstances nere, where the 
court found that the parties aad an under-
standing and agreement that Jn order for the 
silo to be useful to the defendants it was 
to be installed by harvest ti~e. and that 
this was an essehtlal to ~~e cont~act 
becoming effective. 61~ P.2d 329. 
Th~s =~ 1A~t also ~ound no basis to upset the lcwer cou:t's 
holding c1at: 
t~ere ~ad been a 1a1~~re to ~ur~1s~ 
the agreed C:Jr..S:L·_-:3.erat_:_c:in b:· t:--.e _?lain-:i:=:: 
[FMA] and tnat t-_-iererore, ':he ,j,e::'enca:',ts 
[Hansen] ,,1e:ce '."'.O~ bcu~;.:l :.:: .:-:Jn :..:.r:·_:e ~a:zi.:-~LT 
paymer,'ts ·.)L r~ :cnI:.:-ac:.. ()j_-. :J.~d 330. 
P.2d 454 rut3.n ~-J32) 
:::.--esc.:ssi::n 
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n :::iecause '1FT did not provide the exact 
''ccoC~ l cied in the lease. MFT had apparently 
l ~ c''.u lt-imen t from Pursinger and leased the 
The equipment was delivered by 
:~,ffsl:1<cc and 'llelsen acknowledged delivery. MFT argued 
chat 'i1:.elserc shuuld not have been allowed to adduce parol 
ev1dectce cf ta1l~re of consideration because it con-
•radicted the ~erms of che written lease. This court 
stcited that: 
Evidence of failure of consideration 
·:.'<)PS not 11a!::'J' or alter the terms 0£ a con-
tract; it attacks the very existence of the 
-,~n r_ ract tor the purpose of pro\'ing it 
rnenforceable. 6S6 ?.2d 456. 
C~·n.sideration may be found in many forms and 
.1nti2c 3. ·1:ice rarJ et:; of circumstances. In Sugarhouse Finance 
':G. .::VH:le::.son, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980), this court 
S-C3t2d: 
~o completely satisfactory and com-
r:..r~!-:er:.s1',re def1:i1t1on of 11 cor.s1deration" 
fBs "'"er been devised. It is generally 
3_:~-'e~, :101,ve•;er, that 'Nhere a promise is 
s",-' .~r':eu by tr.e lf'Currence, on the part 
.- ''1C or~r'lisee, ,:::fa legal detriment in 
-~er ~ :~r1~er ~ berre£1t on the promiser, 
~·J _3 3·~~~1c1ent ~o serve as consideration, 
-·,~ ~~· r~r1de~ina ~~~ Dromise lecallv 
eable. 6:6 ~~~d.1369, 137~ .• 
Certainl:;, 
For something co be C'Jt""St_:~:..t-:._:_ r., 
elements of an oral cc~orac~. 
America v. Carnicero Dynast" Cor~-or2.tlor:, S.\S ?.~d 502, 
There l3 ~ dis~~nc~1~~ be~~ee~ la=k 
of cor.sidera:.:..2rL :;.r.J :ai ~ ·J.rr:: o~ consideration. 
Where considerat1011 
no cun<:r.3-c-:.. 
~s 13.ck~ng, t~ere 2a~ be 
,=~~s1derat1:Jn ~ails, t~ere 
·,vas a ccn:.rac"': · ..Jfi.t?r. :-..:.e asreeTT'e!i :_ '•las :na(ie, 
but because of some s·J~erven1!1~ cause, the 
promised perfor~ance ~ails. 543 P.2i 50~, SO~. 
Under the facts :J: :.~.ls case, +:he ?!:"i.11.Se l':sel: 
apart ==~~ t~s later per:orMa~ce, l~ ~n;. 
that the Lessor's or2.l promise 01~e~ · ... ias :.he 
condition and cons1Ge::::-3.'=.l'.:Jr1 :c.r ~.--.(::: sl;ni~-:.·.: J: ":.:-',e ' ... ;r1<:-:.er. 
renewal lease. 
been n0 wr1t~en l~ase. 
-1s-
J f0 ";;_, ,::'JNTPAC':', IT COULD NOT RETURN A 
E "CI,:'.':' F0P APPELLA.'lT. 
r1~ lJwer court erroneously refused to even allow 
i.-;e'' --r ::.i-1e 'Nord "cons1derat1on 11 in its instructions. 
In Instruction 16 (R-140), the lower court 
sta·e~ tnat the jury could not return a verdict for 
Apcellant unless the jury ~ound the following four 
pr0pos1·_ions t::i be tP1e: (1) t:-tat there was an oral 
c0ntract for: tne additional space; (2) that the oral 
- .ntract ~~s 3 sond1t1on precedent to the written lease; 
lJ t:hat ':he ~ral contract was breached; and (4) that 
''''P<-' l 1 d11 t 1c '":e1~ to rescind the lease ·,n thin a reasonable 
t_.;_n:e. 
Instruction 17 (R-141) provides that there could 
be an ~ral contract unless four specific elements 
rle'e established; i"e", the additional space to be leased, 
~:C 1~ 1 cice, tne term, and the remodeling costs. 
':''1e i ,~wer court then stated in Instruction 18 
':~"''" :~,e oral contract, if any, could not be a 
''r~cedent dnless it was intended "to be fully 
~~=~~~ ~he w~1tten lease agreement was to become 
d::..~.c." 
-.i' -
the jury could not return a ~erctict ::~ Appellant resarc-
less that the written rene~.·.ial lease ·.-.:0ulJ e'Ier r.a·.re 
existed i= the promise ~ad not been ~ade. T~e lesscr's 
agent confirmed that the promise was made to induce the 
signing of the written lease. Instead, the lower court 
required a spec1£1c oral contract as a condition precedent. 
The lower court's instructions thus nullified the promise 
and essentially directed the Jury to ret~rn a ~erd1ct for 
SC1. Such a result is contrary to the legal principles 
set forth in the FMA and Nielsen cases c1 '.:e·-=l abo'Js. 
PODlT III. 
THE LOWER COURT ER.:IBD Dl :TOT 
ALLOWING APPELLl'u'lT THE _'.LTERllATI\tE 
REMEDY TO TERMillATE THE ';JRITTEN LE.:\SE 
FOR LHLURE OF CONSIDERATION EVEN IF 
THE COURT DETER.'11"lED TH.'\T .'.PPELL.".c"lT 
COULD NOT SPECIFICALLY ENFORCE THE 
ORAL PP.OM I SE. 
and Special I::..t:.e2:rosator1es :?_-133-~4) t:;-:e l~· .... ,e:- ~:::1...:::.·:. 
determined tha~ 'J.nless ':.:-i.ere · .. ;as 3.r. -::n::::r::~3.tl~ 
~nd 2 ~ere ~r~elevan~. 
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:·~ -~-;~1se i~sel~ ~as CQ~s1der3t1on and therefore 
~-i:w Ap9ellant tne alternative remedy of 
:ne lease upon repudiation of the promise. 
t:·;en as:ouming t:hat the promise might not have 
;~~~ s~ec:~:callj en~orceable by Appellant for any reason 
s~c~ 33 t~~ St3tute :if Frauds or absence of specific 
=~n:rac: provisions, rescission is available if the 
~~G8lSe ~as considerat:1an for Appellant's signing of 
':''.us cc•1rt: '."las discussed the def1n1tion and 
:~~a·=t 1.::f :ail:-..:.re or lack of consideration in the FM...i\, 
'.l1">lsen, Su·:;ar'."iouse ?inance, and the General Insurance 
cases ::'.:ed above, and is in accord with the decisions in 
In 17 C.J.S. Contracts §129, pages 
o4?-)0, tnere is a general discussion of lack or failure 
It is la1C. cio1. ... n in a number of cases that 
·~hen ~~e cons1derat1on :or a promise wholly fails 
:ne promise is w1'.:hout cons1derat1on and 
·1nen:'orceable; C:u'.: '.::1ls must mean that in a 
::c:n~:-ac~ ·.v:.t;,. =..r. 2xeC',Jt:ir:- ::onsi:i..eratior.., the 
~xec~~ion o~ ~~e =ons1derat10~ is a condition 
~r2cedent to t~e l:abi:i~y on ~he ?romise, a~d 
~~e ~a1l~re tc exec~~e ~he cons1derat1cn d1s-
cnsrges the promiser. Ahere '.:here is a total 
~3:~~re 0£ c~~s1der2t1~n and defendant has 
::'2:-1.·?ed :-10 'oe!"' .. e::i-: :=:-::m t~e contract, or none 
~~~·=~~ ~~e 2r0Lln~ ~~ ~o~e~· ·~h12h ~e ~as already 
1d·.·~nced, sue~ ~ai:~r~ ~f ccns1derat1on ma~· be 
01. ~·-\r. :...:;. .:a:- ::>: "::::e 3.c':.:...::r:. 
Contracts sets ~orth tne ~~ 
In the instant case, ~~e ~rom1se ro~ ~~e 
additional space was clearly tne :ons1jerat1on for the signing 
of the lease. Where the consideration was repudiated, 
the appropriate remedy was rescission. 
POINT IV. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWDJG 
THE JURY TO CONSIDER ON THE ISSUE OF 
~ITIGATION OF DAMAGES LOST REN'I' ON 
Al'lOTHER FLOOR WHEN THERE :'iAS ~JO LEi\SE 
I::-1 FORCE AND CHARGE THE SA.'1E TO 
APPELLANT. 
The Norwest lease for the third ~loor was to 
terminate on .;\pril 30, 1982 (Exhibit 3-P). 
that SCM acted reasonably in allowing clcr'~·est tc ·;acate 
the area on the third floor and move to the area on the 
sixth floor, SC~ would not be entit!ed to cnarge Accellant 
rent on the third floor for the ~ontns 
t'.1ose months. 
rent for t~e ~onths of ~ay ~nd J:J~~, :9~2. 
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·s1-=. ::-eri:. ,'?-21:31. Lnder no circumstances is SCM 
:tted to credit ~or the $1,434.DO rent plus interest 
·1~r~1n a~arded ~or ~nose months~ 
POINT V. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING 
STATUTORY INTEREST AT A RATE OF TEN 
PERCENT (10%J ON A LEASE MADE PRIOR TO 
MAY 14, 1981. 
Section 15-1-1, l1.C.A. 1953 (1981 Supp.) provides 
15-1-1. LEGAL RATE. The legal rate 
of interest for the loan or forbearance of 
any ~oney, goods, or things in action shall 
be 10% oer annum. But nothinq herein con-
tained ~hall be so construed ~s to in any 
way affect any penalty or interest charge 
wh1ch by law applies to delinquent or 
other taxes or to any contract or oblig-
ations made before the 14th day of May, 
19 81. 
Any obligation by Appellant to pay rent originates 
:n the 19:9 lease. The above amended statute prohibits 
:har::iing of interest above the prior statutory rate of six 
::ercent on C'=>r'.tracts or obligations made before May 14, 1981 . 
. ,,:t=-: l•--.)\v'er cour1: a.llcwed interest of ten perce!"lt on rent due 
·: c• cc 'la·.' 1 .J , 19 31 a s v er i f i e d by 1 et t er ::> f 11a r ch 2 1 , 1 9 8 3 
·1·, .:J,~"1' 3 :·:ur.3el wni.::::-. letter is i;:icluded in the record 
The letter was apparently 
- ~ (, -
' l_ : , ',o,' l ~ 
page 1~7 of the Record. 
CONCLUSION 
It is undisputed that Appellant wculd net have 
entered into the written lease without the pr:m1se of 
additional space. The promise was clearly the bargained 
for consideration given by the original lessor which induced 
Appellant to incur the obligation of renewing the written 
lease. It would be fundamentally unfair and contrary to 
law to allow SCM to compel performance and receive benefits 
under the ·'1ritten lease and ignore the failure ·:if the 
promise which brought the lease into being. Ir. th 1 s 
situation, the appropriate, fair and legal remedy is rescissicr 
of the lease. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th iay .:if Jur.e, 1983. 
WATKINS & FABER 
l IhW-r ~I Lf:)u, £{) -
3 ::- i ar. ·.~. 3-;~-::----_-e-,_-_ "-_------
A tt~rn~ ·.· ~sr De~enda~~-A~~ellar.t 
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